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A
fter seven years of controversy and debate, on 
September 16, 2011, President Obama signed into 
law the first major revision of American patent law 
in nearly 60 years. The legislation covers a wide range 
of procedural, substantive, and administrative changes, from 
fee-setting at the U.S. Patent Office, to implementing several 
new administrative procedures involving patents, to precluding 
patents on certain categories of subject matter. 
Entitled the “America Invents Act” (AIA), this legislation 
amends the current patent law with provisions that take effect 
over an 18 month period from the time of signing, culminating 
in major transitions in March of 2013. The legislation has been 
touted by politicians as modernizing U.S. patent law, harmonizing 
it with that of our trading partners, simplifying the patent applica-
tion process, and—most incredibly—stimulating 200,000 new jobs.
The long gestation period of the statutory revisions was the 
direct result of the varied experiences of different stakeholders 
with the patent system and consequent disagreement as to the 
changes necessary to ensure effective patent outcomes. In par-
ticular, the pharmaceutical and information technology sectors 
held strongly differing views as to whether the patent system was 
meeting their needs. 
I have previously observed in work with Mark Lemley of 
Stanford that this seven-year standoff illustrates the problems of 
developing a uniform system to apply to different industries. (See 
“Courts and the Patent System,” Summer 2009.) Elsewhere, we 
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have outlined a workable institutional and doctrinal framework 
for overcoming this problem. Here I measure the AIA against 
this framework, to evaluate both the end product of the Ameri-
can reform effort and whether the outcome might have been 
improved. I conclude that the AIA is in many respects consonant 
with the prescriptions of our framework, but falls disappoint-
ingly short of what might have been achieved.
Dynamic Patent Incentives
There appears to be a general consensus among regulators, 
commentators, and practicing attorneys that the primary pur-
pose of the patent system is to encourage innovation by pro-
viding financial rewards and incentives for new technological 
developments. Yet we know that the innovation profiles of dif-
ferent industries differ dramatically. Technologies in some sec-
tors require massive investment to develop new advancement; 
others require only modest investment. Some technological 
investments lend themselves to a natural return on investment; 
others cannot be recouped without vigilant legal enforcement. 
Some technological developments are durable, providing sub-
stantial returns for many years; others have rapid turnover and 
short product life cycles. Developing a patent system to accom-
modate such diversity poses a substantial challenge. 
Moreover, not only the outcome of innovation, but innova-
tion itself, is in a state of constant flux. Technological innovation 
by its nature is situational, fact-specific, and diverse. Industries 
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are adopted, displacing older methods. The tastes and needs of 
purchasers evolve. New ventures spring into existence and old 
ones fade into senescence or bankruptcy. Sources of revenue and 
capital shift or redirect their attention to new opportunities. 
As I have detailed in previous work with Lemley, technological 
development is dynamic and likely to outpace patent statutes 
that are not equally dynamically updated. Indeed, we might 
almost say that if the patent law is not struggling to keep up 
with the pace of innovation, the law is a failure; the whole point 
of the law is to encourage progressive change. The irony is that 
a successful patent statute continually sows the seeds of its own 
obsolescence, meaning that the patent system itself must con-
stantly innovate to keep pace. 
Thus, a fundamental question for any patent reform is how 
to accommodate almost continual reform; in essence, how to 
constantly re-invent the statute itself. In most democratic systems, 
there is a choice of three state institutions that might possibly 
be designated to oversee the constant updating of legal incen-
tives in the face of dynamic innovation: legislatures, courts, or 
administrative agencies. Each of these institutions has its own 
competencies and deficiencies that bear on the configuration of 
a dynamic patent system.
Innovation Oversight
The first instinct in a democracy is to give responsibility for 
statutory adaptations to the institution with the greatest degree 
of public accountability, as well as the greatest capacity for infor-
mation gathering. Typically this is thought to be the legislature. 
However, timely adaptation of patent statutes through legisla-
tive oversight is simply impractical. Enormous political capital 
is typically required to muster the votes needed to enact any 
new legislation. Given the many demands on the attention of a 
national legislature, it is not realistic to believe that such politi-
cal will can be mustered year-in and year-out in order to update 
patent statutes. Indeed, among the myriad political issues sur-
rounding transportation, health care, taxation, diplomacy, and 
law enforcement, repeated patent reform is unlikely to take 
precedence. It is simply not realistic to expect that the majority 
of a legislative body will continually update itself on the latest 
technological and economic developments facing innovators. 
And even were patent statutes to command the ongoing atten-
tion of the legislature, it might be better if they did not. As the 
saying goes, “No man’s life, liberty, or property is safe when the 
legislature is in session.” A vast literature on public choice theory, 
together with practical experience of the legislative process, warns 
that each new statutory enactment provides opportunities for 
rent-seeking by favored constituencies. Legislative proposals 
quickly become encrusted with special-interest provisions or are 
redirected to unexpected ends.
The manifest impracticality of continuous legislative atten-
tion leaves courts and administrative agencies as the likely insti-
tutional stewards of statutory tailoring. Decisions in judicial or 
quasi-judicial adjudication are typically made by a small body or 
even a single decisionmaker. On the whole, this structure avoids 
the protracted negotiation and political wrangling of the legisla-
tive process. Because a judge or judicial panel is small, outcomes 
do not require accumulating scores or perhaps hundreds of 
votes to reach a decision. Input for the decision comes through 
evidentiary procedures. A diversity of viewpoints, which might 
be important to broad policy declarations, is sacrificed in favor 
of focus and expediency.
Courts and agencies each have their own institutional plusses 
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ability to gather facts, although the evidence-gathering capacity 
of a court system is typically very substantial. Agencies tend to 
suffer from the problem of capture, often developing too cozy 
a relationship with those they regulate. Agencies may also be 
subject to the same lobbying that afflicts legislatures; indeed, they 
may be under considerable political pressure from the legislature 
that controls the agency budget. Courts are not free from these 
problems, but they can largely be insulated from influence ped-
dling by mechanisms such as life tenure. This of course means 
that they are also insulated to some degree from popular senti-
ment, making them often the least democratic option.
The competencies, as well as the incompetencies, of each type 
of institution are also a major consideration. Legislatures, and 
to some extent executive agencies, tend to regulate prospectively, 
before a factual situation arises, and so attempt to anticipate the 
likely course of events. Much of the impossibility of continuing 
legislative insight over innovation stems from the prospective 
nature of statutory enactments. Legislatures are engaged in pre-
dictive regulation, and we have said that innovation is by nature 
largely unpredictable. Indeed, injudicious attempts by legislative 
bodies to anticipate the course of future events are more likely 
to deter or suppress innovative activity than it is to promote it.
Where prediction is difficult, regulation may be best delegated 
to fact-specific ex post oversight—the type of responsive regulation 
most suited to the courts. Courts, and agencies acting in a judicial 
capacity, tend to render decisions after the fact, sometimes even as 
events are unfolding. Of course, this does not mean that courts or 
agencies assume the role properly conducted by a democratically 
elected body; to the contrary, they are engaged in practical applica-
tion of direction given by a legislature. Hopefully, the legislature will 
chart a course for innovation policy, outlining the broad parameters 
by which it should proceed and which can then be implemented by 
the governmental institutions better suited to that task.
Assessing the America Invents Act
How does the text of the AIA and its legislative circumstances 
line up with these general and predictive observations? Both the 
process observed enacting the statute and the final product are 
largely consonant with what one would expect from the tenets 
of dynamic patent oversight that I have outlined above. In many 
aspects, the outcome of the reform effort is congruent with the 
recommendations drawn from the model. Where the AIA fails 
to meet expectations, those failures are largely predicted by the 
model. This means there is both good news and bad news in 
comparing the statute with the paradigm just described. 
We begin by considering the good news, which is in some 
sense the absence of certain bad news. Here one is reminded of 
the classic Arthur Conan Doyle story “Silver Blaze,” in which 
Sherlock Holmes states that he solved the mystery on the basis 
of the “curious incident of the dog in the night-time.” Scotland 
Yard Inspector Gregory, puzzled by Holmes’ statement, observes 
that the dog did nothing in the night-time. Holmes replies that 
this observation pinpoints the curious behavior: it was the dog’s 
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failure to act that provided the vital clue to solve the mystery.
In a very similar fashion, it is the curious behavior of the U.S. 
Congress with regard to the AIA that is perhaps the most striking 
feature of the legislation—that is, the legislature’s inaction is per-
haps more important than its action. For example, burning issues 
that were considered to be of pressing importance when the statu-
tory reform process was begun, and which at some point drove the 
consideration of patent reform, were entirely absent from the final 
bill that was enacted. That seems curious behavior indeed.
The absence of provisions addressing these matters stems 
from a combination of ongoing legislative deadlock and parallel 
ongoing interpretive work of the courts. As I have observed in 
previous work, the very long and often contentious process of 
patent statute revision was long and contentious because of the 
very different innovation profiles of different industries. 
In particular, the pharmaceutical and information technology 
industries were frequently at odds over the proper issues to be 
addressed in patent reform legislation. Elements of the patent 
system that seemed to work well for pharmaceutical innova-
tors seemed to computer and software innovators to be entirely 
dysfunctional, and vice-versa. Year after year, legislation stalled 
because of disagreement over what needed to be reformed and 
what shape reform should take. Industries disagreed over patent 
reform because the kinds of patents needed in one industry were 
not necessarily what were needed in another.
Yet, over the extended period of legislative wrangling, these 
many “pressing” issues became irrelevant or unimportant, having 
been largely resolved by the courts in the interim. Indeed, every 
indication is that the reform legislation was ultimately able to 
move forward because many points of disagreement had been 
rendered moot by judicial resolution. This is precisely what one 
would have hoped; that the majority of issues could be addressed 
through modulation of the existing statute by the courts.
An important corollary to this observation is that the new 
statute is similarly silent on a variety of controversies that were at 
the forefront of patent law during the reform process. For example, 
there is an ongoing and highly contentious question, both in the 
United States and abroad, regarding the scope of patentable subject 
matter. Recent judicial decisions, at both the trial and appellate 
level, have grappled with whether patents should be available for 
biological materials such as genetic sequences. The Supreme Court 
and lower courts have considered and reconsidered the availability 
of patents for so-called “business methods” and the proper extent 
of patents on computer software. These issues were not only under 
active consideration in the courts, but also in the Patent Office, 
and commentary on the question has become a cottage industry 
among academics and members of the practicing bar.
One might have expected Congress to weigh in on these ques-
tions, to help resolve the controversy and uncertainty. But with 
only very slight exceptions, it remained silent on the subject-matter 
question. Given the debates over software and gene patents, the 
sparse and narrow subject-matter changes in the AIA are compara-
tively trivial. The AIA does change the patent statute to state explic-
itly that human beings are not to be patentable subject matter, 
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often saying that the outcome of the legislative process in a 
given instance is the best statute that was possible. This type of 
observation often reflects a path-dependent personal and insti-
tutional investment in achieving some outcome, arising during 
the course of the legislative process. The observation elides the 
very real possibility that in many instances it might arguably have 
been better to have had no statutory change, and to have aborted 
a flawed enactment, rather than to have followed through to a 
suboptimal result. 
The questionable assumption that any statutory revision is 
better than no statutory revision is apparent throughout the 
AIA as enacted, but particularly in the handling of patent prior-
ity and grace-period revisions. The United States has long been 
unusual in two aspects of its patent law. One has been the policy 
of granting the patent to the first inventor, mentioned above. The 
U.S. Patent Office sometimes needed to conduct lengthy admin-
istrative proceedings, called interferences, to collect evidence 
regarding the applicants’ dates of invention, and then awarded 
the patent to the earliest inventor. Priority disputes in other coun-
tries have simply been determined by granting the patent to the 
application with the earliest date. 
A second signature feature of the U.S. patent system has been 
a “grace period” between disclosure and application. This has 
meant that inventors had one year after their invention became 
publicly known to draft and file a patent application. The time 
period could be triggered by public disclosure by anyone, either 
an inventor or a third party. By contrast, most countries do not 
allow a grace period for the inventor or anyone else, but instead 
follow a standard of absolute novelty. Public disclosure of the 
claimed invention immediately bars applicants from obtaining a 
patent in countries following this standard. 
The combination of a “first to invent” system and the one-year 
grace period tended to put U.S. priority dates out of step with the 
rest of the world, greatly complicating multi-jurisdictional patent 
management. Adopting the first-to-file system was expected to 
harmonize the U.S. system with other nations, decreasing patent 
prosecution and management costs for U.S. firms and others 
using the U.S. system.
But the statute that emerged after seven years of legislative 
wrangling is a unique and idiosyncratic regime that is perhaps 
a step closer to “first to file” harmonization, but actually consti-
tutes something quite different. The statute now provides that 
the first inventor to file is entitled to a patent. Unfortunately, the 
statute gives no indication of what mechanism the Patent Office 
should now use to determine whether a given applicant is an 
“inventor” or whether the old interference definitions of “inventor” 
should continue to apply.
The situation is additionally complicated because the statute 
retains a qualified “grace period” only for inventors. If the inventor, 
or someone who has obtained information about the invention 
from the inventor, discloses the invention, the one-year clock 
begins to run. The result is a system that is unprecedented in any 
jurisdiction: a “first inventor to disclose” system that is neither first-
to-file nor first-to-invent. This outcome has neither the virtue of 
but this as a practical matter is nothing new, as it had been Patent 
Office policy for literally decades not to issue patents with claims 
that would encompass human beings. The AIA also precludes from 
patentable subject matter business methods directed to taxation 
procedures. But the many other questions involving software pat-
ents, or patents regarding genes, or other “products of nature” are 
left unaddressed by the new statutory provisions.
One might take the legislature’s silence on gene patents, soft-
ware, and most business methods as tacit approval of such subject 
matter. Some courts may in fact adopt this position as a matter 
of statutory interpretation. But the better inference seems to be 
that the legislature is allowing the judicial interpretive process to 
play out, entrusting resolution of the problem to the courts. With 
the Supreme Court actively engaged in the area, having recently 
decided the Bilski business and computer process case as well as 
the Prometheus case on diagnostic methods, and potentially con-
templating other cases such as the Myriad case on DNA sequence 
patents, the determination of the specifics of patentable subject 
matter could be left to the courts to work out.
An additional bright spot regarding the political economy of 
the AIA might be the inverse proposition from the legislature’s 
silence on issues that the courts may be best suited to handle: 
in a number of instances, Congress addressed matters that only 
it, and not the courts, could properly resolve. For example, the 
United States has long been unique in the world as a “first to 
invent” jurisdiction: among competing claimants, the U.S. Pat-
ent Office attempts to give the patent to the first inventor in time. 
Everywhere else in the world, multiple claims are resolved by 
awarding the patent to the first person to file an application. A 
central goal of the AIA legislation was to change U.S. practice to 
harmonize with other nations. 
Determining to make such a shift away from a first-to-invent 
system would be appropriate for neither the Patent Office nor 
the courts. Such a policy change is properly the provenance of 
the legislature, and the existing statute offered the other branches 
of the government no tools to make such changes. Provisions of 
the AIA that set a new policy in this area are directed to the type 
of matter that is best addressed by new legislation. This, again, is 
precisely what one would have hoped to have happen.
America’s Non-Harmonization
Such is the good news on the AIA; unfortunately, there is plenty 
of bad news to accompany it. The departures from the optimal 
paradigm are as significant as the instances of adherence.
The first and most noticeable drawback is that the process 
of legislative enactment produced a bill so distorted from the 
original parameters of reform as to be essentially unrecognizable. 
The process of legislative compromise and amendment nearly 
always changes bills between start and finish, and to some extent 
this is what is supposed to happen. But in some cases, it may be 
necessary to distinguish between legislative purpose that has 
been reoriented and legislative purpose that has been derailed. 
Politicians are fond of observing that no legislation is perfect, 
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domestic familiarity nor the virtue of international harmonization.
Instead, the system potentially creates opportunities for stra-
tegic disclosure of inventions—an inventor could publicly disclose 
the invention in order to block rivals from obtaining a patent, and 
then file her own patent application within the one-year statutory 
period. Such strategies will of course be complicated by the global 
economy. Recall that most countries do not allow a grace period. 
An inventor considering strategic disclosure of the invention would 
have to surrender the opportunity to obtain a patent in most coun-
tries in the world. A U.S. patent would still be available within a year, 
but elsewhere the preclusion would be immediate. This scenario 
might be most likely for small entities intending to file only in the 
United States—perhaps because the only real market for the inven-
tion is in the United States, or perhaps because the expense of filing 
patents all over the world is prohibitive. 
Other opportunities for strategic maneuvering abound in the 
short term. The new legislation requires the Patent Office over the 
next few months to phase out two existing types of administrative 
challenges to patents, and to implement several new ones. The 
United States has for many years had a system of inter partes “reex-
amination,” whereby anyone believing that a patent was improperly 
granted could challenge the patent on the basis of unconsidered 
prior-art evidence. A year from the enactment of the new statute, this 
will be replaced with a system of post-grant opposition, which will 
be more constricted in timing, but broader in its scope of inquiry. 
Similarly, the old interference system will be replaced with a 
new, narrower “derivation” proceeding that is intended only to 
determine if the invention claimed in an application has been 
improperly derived from another inventor. Additionally, third 
parties can now submit to the Patent Office evidence regarding 
pending applications. Over the next several months, challengers 
to patents will have to determine whether they wish to invoke 
such proceedings, and whether it is more advantageous to do so 
under the old or the new system.
Indeed, some such strategic maneuvers have already been 
made. Although the courts had made significant progress toward 
curbing the activity of “non-practicing entities”—sometimes pejo-
ratively called “trolls” (see “The Private and Social Costs of Patent 
Trolls,” Winter 2011–2012)—who derive income from acquiring 
and enforcing latent patents, Congress decided to add to the AIA 
a new “non-joinder” provision, which prohibits lawsuits naming 
multiple parties for infringing the same patent. The provision 
raises the cost of enforcement by requiring that patent rights be 
enforced seriatim against putative infringers. Not surprisingly, the 
day before President Obama signed the AIA, a record number of 
patent lawsuits naming multiple parties were filed.
Puzzling New Provisions
In addition to the distortion of the original purpose of the 
statutory revision, the AIA accumulated numerous specialized 
provisions favoring various constituencies, including indepen-
dent inventors, universities, software vendors, financial services, 
and pharmaceutical manufacturers. Some of the most pro-
nounced lobbying, resulting in some of the most spectacular 
giveaways, came from American universities, which will enjoy 
special reduced fees for patent applications and processing, as 
well as special immunities to infringement based on prior use 
of an invention that is subsequently patented by someone else.
The last major revision of the U.S. patent law in the 1950s dif-
fered substantially from the product of the most recent revision. 
The previous patent act brought little in the way of statutory 
surprises, but was instead a relatively coherent codification of 
judge-made law—for example, incorporating into the statute the 
non-obviousness standard that had been developed by courts 
during the previous decades. This unfortunately is not the case for 
the AIA, where most of its changes are unprecedented and novel.
In some cases, the revisions introduced into the statute are 
new terminology that will require administrative and judicial 
interpretation before it can be understood. For example, the pro-
hibition on human beings as subject matter, mentioned previously, 
prohibits patents “directed” to or encompassing a “human being.” 
This is so ambiguously worded that some have wondered whether 
a literal reading would prohibit pharmaceutical patents, since 
they are “directed” to humans. Additionally, some observers have 
opined that this provision could exclude patents involving human 
embryos, much as has been done in Europe. However, the statute 
does not define “human being,” and it may well be that embryos 
do not constitute human beings (in a legal sense, at least), leaving 
another contentious ambiguity for the courts to work out. 
Similarly, the “first inventor to file” amendments to the stat-
ute introduce a new and previously unknown category of prior art 
against which the patentability of inventions is to be measured. 
To determine if an invention is worthy of a patent, courts and the 
Patent Office compare its description to certain classes of known 
documents and activities, called collectively the “prior art.” These 
include categories such as “printed publications” and “offers for 
sale” that have a well-established meaning in American patent 
law. But the AIA inexplicably adds an undefined and unfamiliar 
new category: information “otherwise available to the public.” 
Commentators are already debating what this might include. It 
will likely take the courts decades to determine what fits into this 
category and how it is to be differentiated from other previously 
known categories of prior art.
In other cases, the revisions create gaps or anomalies that can 
only make sense by looking to past practice. For example, the 
new statute provides for a novel type of administrative procedure, 
called “derivation proceedings,” to take place in the Patent Office 
when an inventor alleges that someone else’s application infringes 
on the innovator’s work. “Derivation” here denotes some type of 
intellectual misappropriation or theft. Unfortunately, the new 
statute provides no definition of “derivation.” This term is taken 
from a provision of the old statute, section 102(f), where it had 
been interpreted and had a fairly settled meaning. However, sec-
tion 102(f) was eliminated from the new statute, which might be 
taken as a sign that the legislature intended to do away with the 
matter. In order to implement the new proceedings, it may be that 
the Patent Office and the courts will adopt the old meaning and 
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case law regarding section 102 derivation, but it is not free from 
doubt whether they would be correct to rely on a provision that 
has been repealed.
Statutory Inconsistencies
In addition to new and undefined statutory terms, the AIA also 
suffers from inconsistencies between the new amendments to 
the statute and longstanding provisions that were left intact. 
These anomalies are numerous, and perhaps the strangest of 
them is that involving the patent “best mode” requirement.
The United States has long had a best mode requirement, 
which requires an inventor to disclose in the patent application 
the best mode known to her of practicing the claimed invention. 
This is part of the patent bargain: the public grants the inventor 
a period of legal exclusivity in return for a disclosure of how to 
make and use the invention, which becomes publicly available 
knowledge when the patent expires. The best mode requirement 
is intended to keep the inventor from cheating on the bargain, 
possibly disclosing inferior methods of practicing the invention 
while keeping the best method a trade secret.
However, best mode has long been troublesome for patent 
applicants, in part because it is not required in the majority of 
countries. An application drafted for submission overseas, and 
then subsequently filed in the United States, might not include 
the best mode, resulting in some difficulty in keeping multina-
tional patent applications in compliance with the U.S. standard. 
Additionally, the best mode requirement is subjective, requiring a 
determination regarding the best mode known to the inventor—a 
state-of-mind inquiry that is often difficult for either the Patent 
Office or a court to assess. There have long been calls for Congress 
to eliminate the requirement for these reasons.
But that is not what occurred in the enactment of the new 
statute. What Congress actually did in the AIA is far more confus-
ing. The statute still requires that the inventor disclose the best 
mode, just as it did before, but Congress specified that failure 
to disclose the best mode cannot be grounds for invalidating 
the patent. Under this amendment, the courts cannot declare 
a patent defective if it lacks the best mode explanation that the 
patent statute says it must have. This appears to mean that there 
is effectively no penalty for failure to disclose the best mode.
These provisions seem contradictory and, at best, send mixed 
signals to patent applicants. They raise questions as to what the stat-
ute is intended to accomplish and whether applicants will bother to 
comply with the statutory requirement. Why would anyone comply 
with a requirement for which there is no sanction? The possible 
motivations, besides sheer public-mindedness, are sparse. First, 
since best mode disclosure is at least ostensibly still a requirement, 
if the Patent Office detected an omission of best mode in an appli-
cation, it could deny the patent. But the Patent Office will seldom 
have the information to detect such an omission, so this seems a 
remote likelihood. Second, Congress left open the possibility of a 
criminal prosecution for egregious violations, but the likelihood of 
a prosecutor pursuing such charges also seems remote. 
Third, and most troubling, this inconsistency places patent 
attorneys in a difficult ethical position. It may be an ethical viola-
tion for an inventor’s attorney to willfully assist in concealing the 
best mode, since that is required by the statute, but sanctions for 
such a violation also seem remote. Yet, attorneys could be put in a 
conflict of interest situation where it is in the client’s best interests 
to withhold the best mode—and there is no real penalty for doing 
so—but the attorney’s duty of candor to the Patent Office remains. 
In its inelegant revision of the statute, Congress may have created 
a situation in which the interests of the patent attorney and those 
of her client diverge. 
Conclusion
Legislative patent reform can be a costly proposition. Aside from 
the problem of special interest rent-seeking, the switching costs 
of adapting common practice to new legislation can be extraor-
dinarily high. The America Invents Act offers a prime example 
of such switching costs. Although businesses will likely experi-
ence somewhat lowered costs in managing international pat-
ent filings, the legislation disrupts long settled law, creates new 
opportunities for gamesmanship, foments new litigation, and 
introduces new uncertainty into business decisionmaking. 
Perhaps ironically, this means that the true business of patent 
reform is left to the U.S. Patent Office and the courts, where it 
may have been better to have placed it in the first instance. The 
many ambiguities and inconsistencies will ultimately be given 
meaning by judicial interpretation. It will unquestionably take 
decades of litigation before we know what many of these statu-
tory changes introduced into patent law mean for innovation. 
The political claim that the AIA will create 200,000 new jobs may 
well prove to be true, but they will be jobs for patent lawyers.
reAdIngs
■■ “A Guide to the Legislative History 
of the America Invents Act: Part I of 
II,” by Joe Matal. Federal Circuit Bar 
Journal, Vol. 21 (2012).
■■ “A Guide to the Legislative History 
of the America Invents Act: Part II of 
II,” by Joe Matal. Federal Circuit Bar 
Journal, Vol. 21 (2012).
■■ “America Invents, More or Less?” 
by Jason Rantanen and Lee Pether-
bridge. University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review PENNumbra, Vol. 160 (2012).
■■ “America Invents the Supplemental 
Examination But Retains the Duty 
of Candor: Questions and Implica-
tions,” by Lisa Dolak. Akron Intellectual 
Property Journal, Vol. 6 (2012).
■■ “Courts and the Patent System,” 
by Dan L. Burk and Mark A. Lemley. 
Regulation, Vol. 32 (2009).
■■ “Derivation and Prior Art Prob-
lems with the New Patent Act,” by 
Joshua D. Sarnoff. Patently-O Patent 
Law Journal, 2011.
■■ “In Memoriam: Best Mode,” by 
Jason Rantanen and Lee Petherbridge. 
Stanford Law Review Online, Vol. 64 
(2012).
■■ “Priority and Novelty under the 
AIA,” by Robert P. Merges. Working 
paper, 2012.
■■ “The Effect of the Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act on Collaborative 
Research,” by Scott Pierce. Journal of 
the Patent and Trademark Office Society, 
Vol. 94 (2012).
■■ “The Pseudo-Elimination of Best 
Mode: Worst Possible Choice?” by 
Lee Petherbridge and Jason Rantanen. 
UCLA Law Review Discourse, Vol. 59 
(2012).
■■ “Understanding the America 
Invents Act: Its Implications for Pat-
enting,” by Robert Armitage. AIPLA 
Quarterly Journal, Vol. 40 (2012).
 
